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I.

ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL

Respondents, the Idaho Board of Veterinary Medicine and its members ("Board"), seek
attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 12-117(1) and 12-121. In addition, the
Board disputes that the issues on appeal concern points numbered 2 and 3 on page five of
Appellant's Brief. The very specific issue for this Court to decide is whether the district court's
finding that Appellant Kirby Vickers, a cat-owning member of the public, lacked standing to seek
judicial review under the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act ("IAPA"), namely Idaho Code§
67-5270, based upon the facts alleged in this case.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On Monday, January 29, 2018, Mr. Vickers's kitten was sick so he contacted Canyon
Small Animal Hospital at 5:30 pm, where veterinarian Dr. Kelly Collins worked. (R. at 17; see

id. at 20.) Mr. Vickers was informed that Dr. Collins could not help Mr. Vickers and to "take the
kitten to West Vet" (another veterinary clinic). (Id. at 17.) Mr. Vickers "became angry and asked
if they were going to let the kitten die." (Id.) The person on the phone indicated that they would
not let the kitten die but would also not be able to treat it. (Id.) Mr. Vickers asked for Dr. Collins
to call him back and that he "would be filing a complaint with the Vet Board." (Id.)
The following day, Dr. Collins called Mr. Vickers and terminated the veterinary-patientclient-relationship between her and Mr. Vickers and also cancelled an upcoming appointment
that Mr. Vickers had with her clinic. (Id.)
Mr. Vickers sent a letter to the Board on March 5, 2018, outlining various "Principals of
Veterinary Medical Ethics" that he claims Dr. Collins violated. (Id.) Mr. Vickers lodged
numerous other allegations against Dr. Collins, including that: (1) she was in "Civil Breach" for
cancelling his upcoming appointment; (2) she was negligent in her treatment of one of his other
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cats; (3) West Vet also provided "negligent care"; and (4) Dr. Collins and West Vet were in
"collusion" to violate the Principals of Veterinary Medical Ethics. (Id. at 17-18.) Mr. Vickers
asked the Board to discipline Dr. Collins by suspending her license for two months and require
that she take an ethics class before her license was restored. (Id. at 19.)
Under the Idaho Veterinary Practice Act, found at Idaho Code§§ 54-2101 et seq., the
Board has the authority to, among other things: (1) license veterinarians (Idaho Code§ 542105(8)(b)); (2) initiate and conduct investigations when there is a complaint against a
veterinarian (Idaho Code§ 54-2105(8)(±)); (3) initiate and conduct disciplinary hearings or
proceedings to adjudicate complaints (Idaho Code§ 54-2105(8)(g)); and (4) discipline
veterinarians, including license suspensions and fines (Idaho Code§ 54-2105(8)(c)).
The Board's Liaison Officer initiated and conducted an investigation into Mr. Vickers's
complaints against Dr. Collins. (See R. at 20; see also Idaho Code§ 54-2105(6)). On August
24, 2018, the Board's Liaison sent Mr. Vickers a letter informing him that after thoroughly
examining his written complaint, the medical records and responses, and consulting with
colleagues, she "did not find violations of the Veterinary Practice Act by Dr. Collins" and closed
Mr. Vickers's complaint. (R. at 20.) Thus, the Board did not prosecute Dr. Collins and no
disciplinary hearings or proceedings were instituted against Dr. Collins.
On September 20, 2018, Mr. Vickers filed this lawsuit against the Idaho Board of
Veterinary Medicine. (R. at 6-12.) Mr. Vickers filed a First Amended Complaint on October 10,
2018, against the Idaho Board of Veterinary Medicine and each of its members (hereafter
"Complaint"). (R. at 13-20.) Mr. Vickers asked the district court to remand "this matter" back
to the Board and require it to give him a hearing, apparently so that Dr. Collins could be
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prosecuted and disciplined. (R. at 16.) He also sought his costs and attorney's fees incurred in
this case. (Id.)
On November 11, 2018, the Board filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint, with
prejudice, under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(l). (R. at 21.) The Board argued the
district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear this case because Mr. Vickers lacked
standing to seek judicial review under the IAPA. (R. at 23-33.) The Board argued Mr. Vickers
was not "aggrieved" by the Board's decision declining to prosecute Dr. Collins, and the Board's
decision to investigate did not result in an "order" from a "contested case." (Id.) And, because
IAP A did not provide judicial review in this case, sovereign immunity preluded Mr. Vickers's
claims and the relief he sought. (Id. at 33-34.)
The district court granted the Board's motion to dismiss, finding Mr. Vickers did not
have standing to challenge the Board's decision declining to initiate a contested case because he
did not meet either Idaho Code § 67-5270(2) or (3). (Id. at 75-80.) And the district court ruled
that sovereign immunity prevented Mr. Vickers from seeking a writ compelling the Board to
grant him a hearing and also precluded him from challenging the Board's discretionary decision
not to prosecute Dr. Collins. (Id. at 78.) The district court entered its Judgment dismissing the
Complaint with prejudice on July 1, 2019. (Id. at 83.) Mr. Vickers appealed the district court's
Judgment on August 8, 2019. (Id. at 85.)
The district court's decision dismissing the Complaint should be affirmed. Mr. Vickers
does not have standing to seek judicial review of the Board's decision declining to prosecute Dr.
Collins. Mr. Vickers is neither: (1) a person aggrieved by a final agency action other than an
order in a contested case; or (2) a party aggrieved by a final order in a contested case. As a
result, because IAP A did not confer jurisdiction on the district court to hear Mr. Vickers's
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claims, they are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Moreover, the discretionary
decision by the Board not to prosecute Dr. Collins cannot be compelled through the issuance of a
writ. In addition, the Board should be awarded attorney's fees on appeal.
III.

ARGUMENT

When a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an action, a motion to dismiss under
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(l) is appropriate. 1 See Owsley v. Idaho Indus. Comm 'n, 141
Idaho 129, 133, 106 P.3d 455,459 (2005) (citation omitted). A challenge under Rule 12(b)(l)
can be either facial or factual. Id., 141 Idaho at 133 n.1, 106 P.3d at 459 n.1 (citing Osborn v.
United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729 n.6 (8th Cir. 1990); 5B Wright & Miller§ 1350). "Facial
challenges provide the non-movant the same protections as under a 12(b)(6) motion." Id.
(citation omitted). "Factual challenges, on the other hand, allow the court to go outside the
pleadings without converting the motion into one for summary judgment." Id. (citation omitted).
A Rule 12(b)(l) facial challenge "standard ofreview mirrors that used under 12(b)(6)." Id.
"[W]hen the district court's decision to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is
based on the complaint alone, or on the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced
in the record, the appellate court's review is 'limited to determining whether the district court's
application of the law is correct and, if the decision is based on undisputed facts, whether those
facts are indeed undisputed."' Osborn, 918 F.2d at 730 (citation omitted). "If the court relie[s],
however, on its own determination of disputed factual issues, the appellate court must then
review those findings under the 'clearly erroneous' standard." Id. (citation omitted).

1

A challenge to standing is generally raised by a party in the trial court by way of Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(l), as it raises issues concerning subject matter jurisdiction of the district
court. Deutsche Bank Nat'/ Tr. Co. v. Breinholt, No. 40748, 2014 WL 6804502, at *2 (Idaho Ct.
App. Dec. 3, 2014).
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The standard of review for granting a motion to dismiss pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)( 1) is the same as if the motion to dismiss were governed by Rule 12(b)( 6).

Emp 'rs Res. Mgmt. Co. v. Ronk, 162 Idaho 774, 777, 405 P.3d 33, 36 (2017). When ruling on a
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), "the non-moving party is entitled to have all inferences
from the record viewed in his favor." Young v. City ofKetchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104, 44 P.3d
1157, 1159 (2002). "After drawing all inferences in the non-moving party's favor, [the Court
must] then ask whether a claim for relief has been stated." Id. (citation omitted). "The issue is
not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the party is entitled to offer
evidence to support the claims." Id. (citation omitted).

A. The district court's decision to dismiss the Complaint should be affirmed because
Mr. Vickers lacks standing to seek judicial review.
"The Idaho Constitution allows the Legislature to delimit the district courts' appellate
jurisdiction." Laughy v. Idaho Dep 't ofTransp., 149 Idaho 867, 870, 243 P.3d 1055, 1058
(2010) (citing Idaho Const. art. V, § 20). "Actions by state agencies are not subject to judicial
review unless expressly authorized by statute." Id. (citing Idaho R. Civ. P. 84(a)(l)). Without an
enabling statute, the district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. 2 Id. (citations omitted). In
addition to identifying a statute that confers jurisdiction on the court, litigants must have standing
to bring the particular claims asserted. This Court has articulated that:
In order to satisfy the requirement of standing, a petitioner must
allege or demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood
that the judicial relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed
injury. Standing requires a showing of a distinct palpable injury

2

Stated another way, the Idaho Supreme Court has succinctly held that: "the state cannot be sued
without its consent .... " Grant Constr. Co. v. Burns, 92 Idaho 408, 412, 443 P.2d 1005, 1009
(1968); accord Sanchez v. State, Dep 't of Corr., 143 Idaho 239, 244, 141 P.3d 1108, 1113
(2006). And any consent to suit must be express and done through a constitutional or statutory
provision. Grant Constr. Co., 92 Idaho at 412, 443 P.2d at 1009. There is no implied consent to
suit for purposes of sovereign immunity. See id.
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and fairly traceable causal connection between the claimed injury
and the challenged conduct.
Injury in fact requires the injury to "be 'concrete and particularized' and 'actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.' "Causation requires the injury to be
"fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the
independent action of some third party not before the court." Finally,
Standing's redressability element ensures that a court has the
ability to order the relief sought, which must create a substantial
likelihood of remedying the harms alleged. Redressability requires
a showing that "a favorable decision is likely to redress [the]
injury, not that a favorable decision will inevitably redress [the]
injury." However, it cannot be only speculative that a favorable
decision will redress the injury.
Emp 'rs Res. Mgmt. Co., 162 Idaho at 777, 405 P .3d at 36 (citations omitted).

The IAPA, at Idaho Code§§ 67-5201 to 67-5292, governs judicial review of agency
actions. 3 Idaho Code § 67-5270(2) and (3), allow petitions for review in two different scenarios.
Judicial review can be sought by: (1) a person aggrieved by a.final agency action, other than an
order in a contested case (Idaho Code§ 67-5270(2) (emphasis added)); or (2) a party aggrieved
by a.final order in a contested case decided by an agency (Idaho Code§ 67-5270(3) (emphasis
added)). Neither instance applies in this case. Mr. Vickers is not "aggrieved," as that term is
used in both statutory provisions, and there has been no "order" resulting from a "contested
case." Mr. Vickers lacks standing to seek judicial review.
1. There was no "final order in a contested case," as required under Idaho Code §
67-5270(3).

Mr. Vickers first argues that he meets the conditions for judicial review under Idaho
Code§ 67-5270(3). This provision states: "[a] party aggrieved by a final order in a contested
case decided by an agency ... is entitled to judicial review under this chapter if the person

3

The Idaho Board of Veterinary Medicine is an "agency" under the IAP A. See Idaho Code §
67-5201(2) (defining "agency" under the IAPA).
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complies with the requirements of sections 67-5271 through 67-5279, Idaho Code." Idaho Code
§ 67-5270(3). Boiled down to its essence, Mr. Vickers argues that when he sent the Board his
March 5, 2018 letter complaining about Dr. Collins, his letter qualified as a "complaint," as that
term is defined by IDAPA 04.11.01.240.01 and .02, and all "complaints" initiate "contested case
proceedings." (Appellant's Br. at 7-12.) He then argues that the August 24, 2018 letter he
received from the Board's Liaison Officer was an "order," as that term is defined in Idaho Code
§ 67-5201(12). (Id. at 16). Ergo, Mr. Vickers claims he is entitled to judicial review under the
IAP A. He is wrong.
Mr. Vickers glosses over the dispositive deficiencies that are fatal to his argument under
Idaho Code§ 67-5270(3). First, Mr. Vickers is flatly incorrect when he argues that he initiated a
contested case proceeding before the Board, entitling him to a hearing. He cannot initiate a
contested case. Idaho Code § 67-5240 states that, "[a] proceeding by an agency4 ... that may
result in the issuance of an order is a contested case and is governed by the provisions of this
chapter, except as provided by other provisions oflaw." (Emphasis added.) Stated another way,
a contested case is a proceeding by an agency, that may result in the issuance of an order. And
the statutory scheme in the IAPA only applies to a proceeding by an agency. Neither Mr.
Vickers-nor any other member of the public-qualifies as an agency under Idaho Code § 675240. Thus, neither Mr. Vickers, nor any other member of the public, can initiate a contested
case before the Board. There is no dispute that the Board declined to initiate a contested case,
and this ends the inquiry.

4

Agency is defined in Idaho Code§ 67-5201(2) as "each state board, commission, department or
officer authorized by law to make rules or to determine contested cases, but does not include the
legislative or judicial branches, executive officers listed in section 1, article IV, of the
constitution of the state of Idaho in the exercise of powers derived directly and exclusively from
the constitution, the state militia or the state board of correction."
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Yet in addition to the fact that no contested case was initiated by the Board with respect
to Dr. Collins, Mr. Vickers does not meet the requirements in Idaho Code§ 67-5270(3) because
the Board's August 24, 2018 letter was not an "order," as defined in Idaho Code§ 67-5201(12)
and IDAPA 04.11.01.005.12. An "order" is an "agency action or particular applicability that
determines the legal rights, duties, privileges, immunities, or other legal interests of one (1) or
more specific persons. Idaho Code§ 67-5201(12); IDAPA 04.11.01.005.12. The district court
correctly held that the Board's decision not to prosecute Dr. Collins did not qualify as an "order."
(See R. at 78, 80.)

The district court relied on the case of Westway Construction, Inc. v. Idaho
Transportation Department, 139 Idaho 107, 112, 73 P.3d 721, 726 (2003), where this Court

outlined a two-step analysis to determine whether an agency decision determines legal rights,
duties, privileges, immunities or other legal interests of a person. (R. at 76.) First, a court must
ask whether the legislature granted the agency the authority to determine the particular issue.
Westway Constr., Inc., 139 Idaho at 112, 73 P.3d at 726. Under the Idaho Veterinary Practice

Act, the Board has the power to "initiate and conduct investigations on all matters relating to the
practice of veterinary medicine" either upon its own motion or upon any complaint. Idaho Code
§ 54-2105(8)(t). The Board also has the authority to decline to initiate a contested case
following an investigation. Idaho Code§ 67-5241(1)(a). Here, the Board conducted an
investigation into Mr. Vickers's complaint through its Liaison Officer,5 which it has authority to
do. Idaho Code §§ 54-2105(6) and (8)(t). The Board declined to initiate a contested case. Thus,
the first part of the test was not in dispute.

5

Mr. Vickers appears to challenge whether the Liaison Officer had authority to investigate his
complaint. (Appellant's Br. at 10.) This is not correct, per Idaho Code§ 54-2105(6).
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The second step is to determine whether the agency decision determines the legal rights,
duties, privileges, immunities, or other legal interests of one or more specific persons. Westway

Constr., Inc., 139 Idaho at 112, 73 P.3d at 726. In this case, the district court correctly
determined that the Board's August 24, 2018 letter did not determine the legal rights, duties,
privileges, immunities or other legal interests of Dr. Collins, and thus did not meet the definition
of an order. (R. at 77-78.) When the Board chose not to prosecute Dr. Collins through a
disciplinary hearing or proceeding, there was no determination or adjudication of Dr. Collins' s
"legal rights, duties, privileges, immunities, or other legal interests," under the Idaho Veterinary
Practice Act. The district court agreed. (R. at 77-88.)

InLaughy v. Idaho Department of Transportation, 149 Idaho 867,873,243 P.3d 1055,
1061 (2010), the Idaho Supreme Court found that the issuance of a permit by the Idaho
Transportation Department was an "order" issued in a "contested case" under the IAP A.
However, analyzing the IAPA, the court noted that Idaho Code§ 67-5241(1)(a) allows an agency
to decline to initiate a contested case. Id. Idaho Code§ 67-5241(1)(a) "recognizes that some
agencies have a prosecutorial function and, when exercising that function, have discretion to
decline to prosecute." Id. In other words, "[ a]gencies can have both prosecutorial and
adjudicatory functions." Id. This distinction is discussed in the Idaho Rules of Administrative
Procedure, found at IDAPA 04.11.01, which implement the IAPA.
Under IDAPA 04.11.01.420, "[w]hen statute assigns to an agency both (1) the authority
to initiate complaints or to investigate complaints made by the public, and (2) the authority to
decide the merits of complaints, the agency is required to perform two distinct functions:
prosecutorial/investigative and adjudicatory." "The prosecutorial function includes presentation
of allegations or evidence to the agency head for determination whether a complaint will be
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issued .... " IDAPA 04.11.01.420.01. "A 'complaint' charges a person with a violation of the
law." Laughy, 149 Idaho at 873, 243 P.3d at 1061. "All pleadings charging other person(s) with
acts or omissions under law administered by the agency are called 'complaints."' IDAP A
04.11.01.240.01. The filing of a complaint initiates a contested case. 6 See IDAP A 04.11.01.210.
However, under Idaho Code§ 67-5241(1)(a), "an agency has discretion to decline to prosecuteto decline to initiate a contested case." Laughy, 149 Idaho at 873, 243 P.3d at 1061.
Illustrating this discretion, the Court in Laughy discussed instances when an agency
declines to initiate a contested case:
For example, under the Idaho Bar Commission Rules ("I.B.C.R."), Bar Counsel
investigates all grievances that allege violations of the Rules of Professional
Conduct. I.B.C.R. 504(b ), 509(a). Bar Counsel has a number of options when
handling a grievance, including the power to seek formal charges. I.B.C.R.
509( c). Yet, after an informal investigation, Bar Counsel often chooses to simply
disregard the matter, to issue an informal admonition, or to privately reprimand
the charged attorney. I.B.C.R. 509(b), (c). While all of these actions would
constitute the agency's disposition in a dispute, none involves an order that
determines the attorney's legal rights, duties, or privileges. These actions would
reflect the presiding officer's decision to "decline to initiate a contested case"
under LC. § 67-5241(1)(a).

Id. (emphasis added). The district court in this case correctly noted that "[n ]owhere in the
[IAPA] or the Veterinary Practice Act has the Legislature required the Board to initiate a
contested case for every letter it receives that contains a grievance or complaint[.]" (R. at 80.)
Again, it is a "proceeding by an agency" that results in the "issuance of an order in a
contested case" that is subject to review under the IAPA. Idaho Code§§ 67-5240; 67-5201(6),
(12); 67-5270(3). Here, the proceeding by the Board was an investigation. Investigations under
the Idaho Veterinary Practice Act do not determine or adjudicate "legal rights, duties, privileges,

Mr. Vickers apparently believes that this sentence out of Laughy implies that all complaints
provided by the public to the Board automatically initiate a contested case. (See Appellant's Br.
at 7, 8, 10, 12, 13.) But neither Laughy, Idaho Code, nor IDAPA support his belief.
6
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immunities, or other legal interests" of veterinarians. Similarly, a decision declining to prosecute

does not determine or adjudicate "legal rights, duties, privileges, immunities, or other legal
interests" of veterinarians. Rather, legal rights, duties, and privileges under the Idaho Veterinary
Practice Act are adjudicated through disciplinary hearings or proceedings that can result in
discipline (such as the suspension of a license). Idaho Code§ 67-5201(8)(c), (g). The Board's
decision declining to prosecute Dr. Collins did not determine any right, duty, or privilege of Dr.
Collins. To the contrary, the Board took no action that in any way affected Dr. Collins's license
or practice. The Board investigated Mr. Vickers's complaint against Dr. Collins, declined to
prosecute her, and closed the complaint. Its August 24, 2018 letter informed Mr. Vickers of this
course of action. Absent some determination of Dr. Collins' s "legal rights, duties, privileges,
immunities or other legal interest," it cannot be said that a final agency order was issued here.
Mr. Vickers lacks standing to seek judicial review under both Idaho Code§ 67-5270(3) and the
district court's decision should be affirmed.

2. Mr. Vickers was not "aggrieved," and as a result, could not obtain judicial
review under either Idaho Code§ 67-5270(2) or (3).
Mr. Vickers also cannot meet the requirements ofldaho Code § 67-5270(2) or (3)
because he is not "aggrieved" as required by those subsections. "Broadly speaking, a party or
person is aggrieved by a decision when, and only when, it operates directly and injuriously upon
his personal, pecuniary, or property rights." Ashton Urban Renewal Agency v. Ashton Mem 'l,

Inc., 155 Idaho 309,311,311 P.3d 730, 732 (2013) (citations omitted). The test as to whether a
party is aggrieved is as follows: "Would the party have had the thing if the erroneous judgment
had not been entered? If the answer be yea, he is a party aggrieved." Id. (citations omitted).
"The effect on the person's interest must be more than a possible or remote consequence of the
order." Id. (citation omitted).
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Mr. Vickers has not, and indeed cannot, articulate how he was injured by the Board's
decision not to prosecute Dr. Vickers. (See Appellant's Br. at 15-18.) At one point, he appears
to argue that he was aggrieved because he did not receive a hearing that he believes he is entitled
to. (Id. at 16.). But as set forth above, Mr. Vickers had no legal right to a hearing in this case.
Mr. Vickers also appears to vaguely argue that the Board's August 24, 2018 letter had "findings"
that "most certainly adjudicated all of [his] interests" by finding "he had no legal rights,
privileges or other legal interests concerning Dr. Collins[.]" (Id.) But this is foreclosed by the
letter itself. The Board does not state that Mr. Vickers had no legal rights, privileges, or other
interests concerning Dr. Collins. (R. at 61.) The Board's letter stated that the Board "did not
find violations of the Veterinary Practice Act by Dr. Collins" after a thorough examination of
Mr. Vickers's complaint, the medical records and responses, and consultation with other
colleagues. (Id.) The Board's letter says nothing about Mr. Vickers's legal rights vis-a-vis Dr.
Collins. Mr. Vickers was free to pursue whatever legal alternatives he believes he had against
Dr. Collins for what he perceived were "malpractice and ethical violations." (Appellant's Br. at
16.) He was not, however, aggrieved by the Board's August 24, 2018 letter.
Moreover, even if the Board had prosecuted Dr. Collins or initiated discipline against her
following an adjudication, it is speculative what the outcome would have been or what discipline
might have resulted. In particular, whether the Board would have suspended Dr. Collins's
license for two months and required her to "take and pass a course on Veterinary ethics from an
accredited source prior to her license being restored," as Mr. Vickers requested, is purely
speculative. (R. at 19.) And had Dr. Collins's license been suspended and if she had been
required to take an ethics course, those actions would have no effect on any personal, pecuniary
or property right of Mr. Vickers-especially because there is no longer a veterinary-patient-
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client-relationship between he and Dr. Collins. (See id. at 17.) Because Mr. Vickers is not
"aggrieved," he cannot obtain judicial review under Idaho Code§ 67-5270(2) or (3). The district
court's ruling in this regard should be affirmed.
B. Since the IAPA does not allow judicial review in this case, sovereign immunity
precluded Mr. Vickers from seeking a "writ or order" compelling the Board to
grant him a hearing.

A suit that seeks to enjoin public officials from taking actions in a governmental matter
over which they have discretionary authority is deemed to be an action against the State, and
sovereign immunity consequently applies. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465
U.S. 89, 110 (1984) (noting suit may not be predicated on violations of state statutes that
command purely discretionary duties); Hadley v. Dep 't of Corr., 840 N.E.2d 748, 752 (Ill. Ct.
App. 2005), aff'd sub nom. Hadley v. Ill. Dep't of Corr., 864 N.E.2d 162 (2007). As set forth
above, the Board's decision not to prosecute Mr. Vickers's complaint and initiate disciplinary
proceedings against Dr. Collins is a non-reviewable discretionary decision. And because the
IAP A does not grant judicial review over such discretionary decisions, Mr. Vickers must identify
some other statute that gave the district court jurisdiction to review the Board's decision. In the
absence of such a statute, this lawsuit is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The
district court's ruling that sovereign immunity precluded the district court from reviewing this
discretionary call should be affirmed.
IV.

REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES

Idaho Appellate Rule 41 governs attorney's fees on appeal. Idaho Code § 12-11 7( 1)
provides that in any proceeding where a state agency and a person are adverse parties, the Court
must award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees if the Court "finds that the
nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." Here, the Board's
reasonable attorney's fees on appeal are warranted under Idaho Code§ 12-117 because Mr.
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Vickers's positions are contrary to the clear language ofldaho Code and relevant case law. And,
Mr. Vickers failed to present any reasonable arguments that he was "aggrieved" under Idaho
Code§ 67-5270(2) and (3), warranting a right of judicial review.
"The purpose ofl.C. § 12-117 is to serve as a deterrent to groundless or arbitrary action
and to provide a remedy for persons who have borne unfair and unjustified financial burdens
defending against groundless charges." Arnold v. City of Stanley, 158 Idaho 218,224,345 P.3d
1008, 1014 (2015) (citation omitted). In Arnold, the Arnolds filed suit against the City of
Stanley under the Open Meetings Law's private right of action for "[a]ny person affected by a
violation of' the Open Meetings Law. Arnold, 158 Idaho at 220, 345 P.3d at 1010 (quoting
Idaho Code§ 67-2347(6) (repealed 2015)). The district court held that the plaintiffs lacked
standing to maintain an enforcement action because based upon the plain language of the law,
they could not show that they were "affected by" a violation of the statute at issue. Id., 158
Idaho at 219, 345 P.3d at 1009. This Court agreed with the district court, and turned to the city's
request for attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-11 7. The Court explained that it did not
typically award attorney fees in matters of first impression, but also stated that "the purpose of
I.C. § 12-117 is to serve as a deterrent to groundless or arbitrary action and to provide a remedy
for persons who have borne unfair and unjustified financial burdens defending against
groundless charges." Id., 158 Idaho at 224, 345 P.3d at 1014 (citation omitted) (alteration
omitted). The Court acknowledged the theory advanced by the plaintiffs, and indicated that they
may have reasonably pursued this theory in the district court, but they did not reasonably pursue
it in the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. (citation omitted). "The clear language of the statute in
question provides that one must have been affected by the violation of the open meeting law,"
and the plaintiffs did show they were affected by a violation in that case. (Id.) Thus, because "a
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plain reading of the statute" contradicted the plaintiffs' position, and because they did not even
claim to have been actually harmed by the facts in that case, the Court held that "their appeal was
brought without a reasonable basis in fact or law" and awarded attorney's fees to the City. (Id.)
The reasoning in Arnold applies here.
In this case, Mr. Vickers acted without a reasonable basis in law or fact pursuing this
appeal. Mr. Vickers's positions in this appeal are contrary to the plain language ofldaho Code
§§ 67-5201(2), (6), and (12), 67-5240, and 67-5241(1)(a); and IDAPA 04.11.01.005.02, 06, and
12, and IDAPA 04.11.01.420. Mr. Vickers also disregarded the reasoning in Westway
Construction, Inc. and Laughy. As the district court found, with respect to Idaho Code§ 67-

5270(3), there was no final "order" resulting from a "contested case." (R. at 78, 80.) This
finding was supported not only by the plain language ofldaho Code§ 67-5201(12) and IDAPA
04.11.01.005.12, defining an "order," 7 but was also contrary to the reasoning in Laughy. By
investigating the issues raised in Mr. Vickers's March 5, 2018 letter and deciding not to
prosecute Dr. Collins, the Board declined to initiate a contested case, which is permitted under
Idaho Code§ 67-5241(1)(a). A decision declining to prosecute does not determine or adjudicate
"legal rights, duties, privileges, immunities, or other legal interests" of veterinarians. As the
district court found in its decision dismissing the Complaint, Mr. Vickers simply "neglected to
consider" the Board's "prosecutorial discretion," making his position unsupported in this case.
(R. at 78.) He continues to advance these unreasonable positions on appeal.
Similarly, going back as early as 1940, this Court has defined what makes a party
"aggrieved." See Dowd v. Dowd's Estate, 62 Idaho 157, 108 P.2d 287, 288 (1940). Like the

Idaho Code§ 67-5201(12) and IDAPA 04.11.01.005.12 defines an order as "an agency action
of particular applicability that determines the legal rights, duties, privileges, immunities, or other
legal interests of one (1) or more specific persons."

7
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case in Arnold, there was nothing in the record here to support a claim that Mr. Vickers was
"aggrieved" by the Board's decision not to prosecute Dr. Collins. Instead of pleading any facts
or asserting reasonable arguments showing that he was "aggrieved," Mr. Vickers made an
unsupported conclusory argument that he was entitled to a hearing. But Mr. Vickers could notand did not-point to any protectable legal interest that he had in this case, and failed to point to
any allegations that supported his claim. The language ofldaho Code§ 67-5270(2) and (3) and
the cases that have defined what makes a person "aggrieved" were clear enough to put Mr.
Arnold on notice that his claim was without a reasonable basis in fact and in law. See Arnold,
158 Idaho at 224, 345 P.3d at 1014.
The purpose of awarding attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-11 7, as discussed in
Arnold, is satisfied here. As a consequence of Mr. Vickers's pursuit of unsupported claims, the

Board bore unfair and unjustified financial burdens at taxpayer expense defending this lawsuit.
An award of attorney fees in this case would serve as a deterrent to future groundless actions
challenging Idaho statutes where litigants disregard the plain language of Idaho's statutes and the
relevant cases that are applicable to their claims, and instead file lawsuits that are unsupported by
either the law or facts. In short, Mr. Vickers's conduct and arguments lacked merit and were not
reasonably grounded in fact or law. The Board is entitled to an award of attorney's fees in this
appeal under Idaho Code § 12-11 7.
Another basis for awarding attorney fees to the Board is Idaho Code § 12-121. See also
Syringa Networks, LLC v. Idaho Dep 't ofAdmin., 155 Idaho 55, 67, 305 P.3d 499, 511 (2013)
(Syringa I) ("[A]ttorney fees may be awarded under any other statute that expressly applies to a

state agency or political subdivision, such as sections 12-120(3) and 12-121."). Idaho Code§
12-121 provides that "[i]n any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the
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prevailing party or parties when the judge finds that the case was brought, pursued, or defended
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." Under this standard, the Court looks at
"whether the losing party's position is so plainly fallacious as to be deemed frivolous,
unreasonable, or without foundation." Doble v. Interstate Amusements, Inc., 160 Idaho 307,
308-09, 372 P.3d 362, 363-64 (2016) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
For purposes ofldaho Code§ 12-121, the Board is a party. Mr. Vickers's Complaint
initiated a civil action. See Idaho R. Civ. P. 3(b ). And for the same reasons set forth above, an
award of attorney's fees here is warranted because Mr. Vickers brought and pursued this case
frivolously, unreasonably, and without foundation and the issues here were not even fairly
debatable.
The language of the statutes and law at issue in this case was clear. See Idaho Code§§
67-5201(12) and 67-5270(2) and (3); IDAPA 04.11.01.005.12. Similarly, the relevant cases
applicable to Plaintiffs claims were well settled. See Laughy, 149 Idaho at 873, 243 P.3d at
1061 (discussing the elements of a contested case); Ashton Urban Renewal Agency, 155 Idaho at
311, 311 P.3d at 732 (citing Application ofFernan Lake Vil!., 80 Idaho 412, 415, 331 P.2d 278,
279 (1958) (quoting 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error§ 183 b, pp. 559 and 561); State v. Eves, 6 Idaho
144, 148, 53 P. 543, 544 (1898); Dowd, 62 Idaho at 108 P.2d at 288; Wash. Cty. Abstract Co. v.
Stewart, 9 Idaho 376, 381, 74 P. 955, 957 (1903) (discussing what constitutes an "aggrieved"

party). Mr. Vickers ignored the reasoning in Laughy and failed to acknowledge the Board's
prosecutorial discretion when he took the position that an order in a contested case had been
issued. And Mr. Vickers failed to present any cogent argument that he was "aggrieved," which
is a prerequisite to obtaining judicial review of an agency action under the IAPA. See Idaho
Code§ 67-5270(2), (3).
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In similar instances where the law is well-settled and a plaintiff fails to present any
evidence to support a required element of his claim, an award of attorney's fees under Idaho
Code§ 12-121 is justified. See Utter v. Gibbins, 137 Idaho 361, 367, 48 P.3d 1250, 1256 (2002)
(awarding attorney's fees under Idaho Code § 12-121 where there was an absence of any
evidence to establish the required element of the claim and the law was well-settled). This is
particularly true where the issues are not fairly debatable. See Matter ofEstate ofBagley, 117
Idaho 1091, 1094, 793 P.2d 1263, 1266 (Ct. App. 1990) (awarding fees under§ 12-121 where
there was no fairly debatable merit that plaintiff's motion was proper); Merrill v. Gibson, 142
Idaho 692, 697, 132 P.3d 449,454 (Ct. App. 2005) (citations omitted) (awarding fees under§
12-121 where the issues were not "fairly debatable" and plaintiffs primary argument lacked
evidentiary support). In sum, an award of attorney's fees is warranted under Idaho Code§ 12117(1). But Idaho Code§ 12-121 also supports an award of attorney's fees in this appeal.
V.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Vickers lacked standing to seek judicial review under the IAPA because he has not
been "aggrieved" by the Board's decision not to prosecute or discipline Dr. Collins. And the
Board's decision to investigate, but not to prosecute or discipline, Dr. Collins is not an "order"
from a "contested case." See Idaho Code § 67-5270(2) and (3). Because the IAPA does not
provide judicial review in this case, sovereign immunity precludes this lawsuit. As such, the
district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction in this case. The district court's decision to
dismiss the Complaint with prejudice should be affirmed and the Board should be awarded its
attorney's fees on appeal.
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